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Abstract— With its growing use in industry, ROS is
rapidly becoming a standard in robotics. While develop-
ments in ROS 2 show promise, the slow adoption cycles in
industry will push widespread ROS 2 industrial adoption
years from now. ROS will prevail in the meantime which
raises the question: can ROS be used securely for industrial
use cases even though its origins didn’t consider it? The
present study analyzes this question experimentally by
performing a targeted offensive security exercise in a
synthetic industrial use case involving ROS-Industrial and
ROS packages. Our exercise results in four groups of at-
tacks which manage to compromise the ROS computational
graph, and all except one take control of most robotic
endpoints at desire. To the best of our knowledge and given
our setup, results do not favour the secure use of ROS
in industry today, however, we managed to confirm that
the security of certain robotic endpoints hold and remain
optimistic about securing ROS industrial deployments.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Robot Operating System (ROS) [1] is the de
facto framework for robot application development [2].
At the time of writing, the original ROS article [1]
has been cited more than 6800 times, which shows its
wide acceptance for research and academic purposes.
ROS was born in this environment: its primary goal was
to provide the software tools that users would need to
undertake novel research and development. ROS’ pop-
ularity has continued to grow in industry supported by
projects like ROS-Industrial (ROS-I for short)1, an open-
source initiative that extends the advanced capabilities
of ROS software to industrial relevant hardware and
applications.
ROS was not designed with security in mind, but as it
started being adopted and deployed into products or used
in government programs, more attention was placed on
it. Some of the early work on securing ROS include
[3], [4] or [5], all of them appearing in the second
half of 2016. At the time of writing, none of these
efforts remain actively maintained and the community
1Vctor Mayoral-Vilches and Stefan Rass are with the System Security
(SYSSEC) group. Martin Pinzger is with the Software Engineering group. Both
from Universitt Klagenfurt, Austria. v1mayoralv@edu.aau.at
2Vctor Mayoral-Vilches and Endika Gil-Uriarte are with Alias Robotics,
Spain
3Bernhard Dieber is with the Institute for Robotics and Mechatronics,
Joanneum Research, Austria
1https://rosindustrial.org/
focus on security efforts has switched to ROS 2, the
next generation of ROS. ROS 2 builds on top of DDS
[6] and shows promise. However, to the best of our
knowledge, there’re still no known robots running ROS
2 in production at scale. From our experience analyzing
robots used in industry, their operating systems, libraries
and dependencies, we argue that ROS 2 is still years
from being widely deployed for major automation tasks.
Until then, ROS will prevail. With the advent of ROS
in industry and professional use, one question remains:
Even though ROS was not designed with security in
mind, can companies use it securely for industrial use
cases?
The present work tackles this question experimentally.
We perform a targeted security exercise, namely red
teaming, to determine whether ROS and more specif-
ically, ROS and ROS-Industrial packages could be used
securely in an industrial setup. We construct a synthetic
industrial scenario and choose one of the most common
industrial robots with ROS-I support to build it. We then
apply available security measures to the setup following
official recommendations [7], [8], [9], [10] and program
a simple flow of operation.
Using this setup, we perform a red teaming exercise
with the overall goal to take control of the ROS com-
putational graph. To achieve this goal, we create four
different attacks that target the ROS-Industrial and ROS
packages. The results show that ROS Melodic Morenia
presents several unpatched security flaws, even when
hardened with community recommendations.
The remaining content is organized as follows: Sec-
tion II presents related work. Section III describes the
selected industrial application and use case. Section IV
provides a walk-through on the red teaming activity.
Finally, Section VI summarizes results and draws some
conclusions while hinting on future work actions.
II. RELATED WORK
Red teaming is a full-scope, holistic and targeted (with
specific goals) attack simulation designed to measure
how well a system can withstand an attack. Opposed
to Penetration Testing (pentesting or PT), a red teaming
activity does not seek to find as many vulnerabilities
as possible to risk-assess them, but has a specific goal.
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Red teaming looks for vulnerabilities that will maxi-
mize damage and meet the selected goals. Its ultimate
objective is to test an organization/system detection and
response capabilities in production and with respect a
given set of objectives. Past works in robot cybersecu-
rity [11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17] criticize the
current status of cybersecurity in robotics and reckon the
need of further research. Previous attempts to review
the security of robots via offensive exercises or tools
include [18], [19], [20], [21], [22], [23] which mostly
focus on proof-of-concept attacks and basic penetration
testing, detecting flaws in ROS. A recent study [24]
mentions the identification of several flaws within ROS-
Industrial codebase, however it does not explicitly de-
scribe ROS-specific flaws. Considerations are made with
regard the open and insecure architecture predominant in
ROS-Industrial deployments throughout its open source
drivers. From interactions with the authors of [24], it
was confirmed that the reported security issues were
made generic on purpose, further highlighting the need
for further investment on understanding the security
landscape of ROS-Industrial setups.
To the best of our knowledge, no prior public work
has performed a red teaming activity on ROS-Industrial
packages (or in any other robotics technology for that
matter), and challenged its security extensions. In this
paper, we present a study in which we aim to do so in
a realistic industrial scenario.
III. USE CASE
We build a synthetic assembly line operated by ROS-
powered robots while following industrial guidelines
on setup and security. The scenario is built following
NIST Special Publication 800-82 [7] Guide to Industrial
Control Systems (ICS) Security as well as some parts of
ISA/IEC 62443 family of norms [8]. We segregate the
use case in 5 network levels as depicted in Figure 1.
The use case involves several robots with their cor-
responding controllers. Most of them presented as pro-
vided by the manufacturer and some others hardened.
For robot (endpoint) hardening we use a commercial
Robot Endpoint Protection Platform (REPP) solution
applied to the controllers, the Robot Immune Sys-
tem (RIS)2. In addition, each robot is connected to a
Linux-based control station that runs the ROS-Industrial
drivers. Control stations are hardened by following the
guidelines described in [25]. To simplify, for the ma-
jority of the cases we assume that the controller is
connected to a dedicated Linux-based control station
that runs ROS Melodic Morenia distribution and the
corresponding ROS-Industrial driver3. For those cases
2The Robot Immune System (RIS), https://bit.ly/3gZ9Opu
3We evaluated both the official ROS-I driver https://bit.ly/2FLaqCl
and the community one https://bit.ly/33273in
that do not follow the previous guideline, the robot
controller operates independent from the ROS network
(e.g. robots R3 and R6). To select the target robots,
we performed a preliminary evaluation of the different
common ROS-Industrial packages. We base our assess-
ment on the potential security bugs identified with static
analysis also covered at [25]. The results showed that
Universal Robots drivers presented the biggest number
of bugs which together with its popularity, made us
select it as our target. The whole process is documented
in [25] which presents an extended version of this study.
Figure 1 presents the architecture diagram of the use
case. To speed up the cybersecurity research and have
a common, consistent and easily reproducible develop-
ment environment, we containerized simulations using
alurity toolbox4. In most cases, for simulation
purposes, the corresponding file systems of each element
in the scenario is embed into a Linux container with
the right services triggered at launch, facilitating the
cooperation across teams of engineers working remotely.
The complete use case depicted in Figure 1 can be repro-
duced with the alurity YAML configuration file available
for download at https://bit.ly/3lWn41G.
IV. RED TEAMING ROS
We performed a red teaming exercise on the ROS
network including ROS and ROS-Industrial packages.
While targeting ROS, a variety of attack vectors were
evaluated. Before diving into the attacks, below, we first
specify the goals of the red teaming exercise, defining
certain boundaries to steer our research. After that, we
analyze a series of attacks that successfully meet the
defined goals.
A. Goals
For the red teaming exercise, our efforts focus on
achieving the following goal:
Goal G1: Control, deny access or disrupt the ROS
computational graph.
Note that if appropriate security mechanisms are
implemented, control of the ROS network might not
necessarily imply control of the robots thereby in
addition, as a secondary target, we also aim at:
Goal G2: Control, deny access or disrupt the operation
of robots (ROS-powered or not).
B. Scope
For the purpose of this red teaming exercise and
as part of the robotic systems selected, the mechanics
are required to be connected to the corresponding con-
trollers, which are the ones operating and interfacing
between the robot and other systems. We discard and
4https://aliasrobotics.com/alurity.php
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Fig. 1: Use case architecture diagram. The synthetic scenario presents a network segmented in 5 levels with segregation implemented following recommendations
in NIST SP 800-82 and IEC 62443 family of standards. There are 6 identical robots from Universal Robots presenting a variety of networking setups and security
measures, each connected to their controller. Sˆn and Cˆn denote security hardened versions of an n control station or controller respectively.
scope out all activities related to the physical damage of
the robot mechanics (servos, encoders and related) by
insider threats. All mechanical aspects including mal-
functions or related are also considered out of the scope.
Similarly and to reduce the complexity of the scenario,
while remaining faithful to most industrial deployments,
we assume that no wireless connection happens between
control stations, robot controllers and/or other devices.
In addition, we assume that no social engineering is
performed and no kernel exploits are used.
C. Attack 1 (A1): Targeting ROS-Industrial and ROS
core packages
In this attack, we adopt the position of an attacker
with access to and privileges in a development machine
D1 at the IT side (see Level 4 in Figure 2). Reaching
such a machine is beyond the scope of this study
but generally consists of an attacker using either a
Wide Area Network (WAN) (such as the Internet) or a
physical entry-point to exploit an existing vulnerability
in the development machine D1 and obtain a certain
amount of privileges (step 1 of the attack diagram
of Figure 2). Further, a privilege escalation will be
performed by the exploitation of additionally vulnerable
services, which allows the attacker to eventually
gain privileges into D1 and command it as desired
(step 2). From D1, an attacker would pivot into
Level 3 by exploiting a vulnerability in the ROS
core and/or ROS-Industrial packages (step 3). Having
gained control of the Central Control Station Sˆ7 the
attacker could decide to establish a reverse channel
of communications directly – avoiding the developer
station – (step 4) or proceed to control Operational
Technology (OT, Level 2 and below) by sending
commands via the ROS computational graph (step 5).
The following subsections detail some of the steps
involved on how our team managed to execute steps 3-5.
1) Step 3: exploiting vulnerability in ROS or ROS-
Industrial packages for remote code execution: Since
we are targeting Sˆ7, we scanned the source code of
Melodic and the common ROS-Industrial packages be-
ing used on it as a ROS Master. We encountered
several potentially exploitable flaws and reported them
all in RVD [26]. Then, we decided to focus on one
existing flaw in the ROS actionlib package. Part
of the ROS core, the actionlib stack provides a
standardized interface for interacting with preemptable
tasks. Examples of use include exchanging information
with an articulated robotic arm (e.g. setting a spe-
cific state). In our setup, actionlib is used both
3
Fig. 2: Attack targeting ROS-Industrial and ROS core packages. The attacker exploits a vulnerability present in a ROS package running on Sˆ7 (actionlib).
Since Sˆ7 is acting as the ROS Master, segregation does not impose restrictions on it and it is thereby used to access other machines in the OT level to send control
commands.
by the Universal Robots ROS Driver and the
ur modern driver ROS-Industrial drivers. These are
running in the control stations S1, S2, S4 and S5,
which interface with robots R1, R2, R4 and R5, re-
spectively. The specific exploitable flaws identified in
the actionlib tools are further illustrated in listing
1. Note, while this flaw is present in a ROS core
package (detected in Melodic, but also in Noetic and
prior released ROS distros), the distributed software
architecture of ROS propagates this vulnerability to both
of the ROS-Industrial drivers mentioned.
Code listing 1 actionlib tools/library.py:132, use of unsafe yaml
load vulnerability reported first in RVD#2401 (https://github.com/
aliasrobotics/RVD/issues/2401). Security flaw highlighted in red.
131 def y a m l m s g s s t r ( t y p e , y a m l s t r , f i l e n a m e =None ) :
132 import yaml
133 yaml doc = yaml.load(yaml str)
134 msgs = [ ]
135 f o r m s g d i c t in yaml doc :
136 i f not i s i n s t a n c e ( m s g d i c t , d i c t ) :
137 i f f i l e n a m e :
138 r a i s e V a l u e E r r o r ( yaml f i l e [%s ] does not c o n t a i n
a l i s t of d i c t i o n a r i e s % f i l e n a m e )
139 e l s e :
140 r a i s e V a l u e E r r o r ( yaml s t r i n g does not c o n t a i n a
l i s t of d i c t i o n a r i e s )
141 m = t y p e ( )
142 r o s l i b . message . f i l l m e s s a g e a r g s (m, m s g d i c t )
143 msgs . append (m)
144 re turn msgs
The flaw itself is caused by an unsafe parsing of
YAML values which happens whenever an action mes-
(a) Action client GUI
(b) Malicious payload
Fig. 3: Remote arbitrary code execution in a machine exploiting a ROS
vulnerability with user interaction. 3a displays the result of remote launching
listing 2 in the attacker’s machine (D1) and against the ROS Master target
(Sˆ7). 3b depicts the payload introduced from the attacker’s machine (D1) and
executed on the target ROS machine (Sˆ7).
sage is processed to be sent, and allows for the creation
of Python objects (step 3). Through this flaw in the ROS
core package of actionlib, an attacker can make Sˆ7,
4
the central control station that runs ROS Master, execute
arbitrary code in Python. Note that actionlib is
common in ROS and ROS-Industrial deployments. Also,
the selected flaw affects actionlib’s tools and depending
on the setup, might require certain user interaction for
its exploitation. We considered the following two attack
scenarios:
a) Remote arbitrary code execution: D1 and Sˆ7
have previously exchanged keys: (A1.1). A common
(though insecure) practice in industrial environments is
to temporarily (or even permanently) exchange keys to
facilitate remote control and monitoring of machines
in the DMZ level (Level 3). This aligns nicely with
the fact that it is common in ROS deployments to rely
on SSH key exchanges for remote ROS node launches
(via XML launch files5). Correspondingly, we built a
custom launch file (listing 2) that enables us to drop
a malicious payload that exploits the vulnerabilities
described above. Once a malicious attacker operating
from D1 initiates this launch file, it establishes an SSH
connection between D1 and Sˆ7 using pre-shared keys,
and forwards the action client GUI visualization to D1
as depicted in Figure 3a. This way, the attacker can
introduce a payload that exploits said vulnerability. We
demonstrate this step in Figure 3b. When sent this mes-
sage causes the action client (actionlib) to execute
the malicious payload. The described process allows for
arbitrary remote code execution (with the privileges of
the ROS setup) exclusively through ROS exploitation.
That is, a flaw in ROS allows the attacker to take control
of the remote machine Sˆ7 via common ROS tools.
b) Privilege escalation: Attacker obtains limited
access to Sˆ7 via other means: (A1.2). Provided the
attacker could execute arbitrary commands on Sˆ7 for
diagnosis (e.g. with a maintainer user) but not with a
ROS graph privileged one, we believe it’s worth further
studying whether the exploitation of the same vulner-
abilities could lead to obtain privileges that allow to
modify the ROS computational graph. Due to time and
budget restrictions for the experiment we were not able
to confirm this, however we argue that is possible unless
ROS specific measures on user privilege-separation have
been implemented.
Code listing 2 ROS custom launch file which enables an attacker to
deliver a malicious payload in a target ROS machine.
1 <launch>
2 <env name="DISPLAY" v a l u e =":0.0" />
3 <machine name="s7" address ="16.0.0.20" env−l o a d e r ="/opt/
ros_ur_ws/devel/env.sh" />
4 <node name="action" machine="s7" pkg="actionlib" type ="
axclient.py" args ="//ur_hardware_interface/set_mode" />
5 </ launch>
5X11 port forwarding is enabled.
2) Step 4: establishing a reverse shell: With listing
2 remotely executed on the target ROS Master (Sˆ7) we
were able to demonstrate how an attacker can remotely
execute arbitrary code. To continue with our attack we
seek for a persistent connection and thereby build a
custom payload that spawns a reverse shell. The code
to do this is depicted in Figure 3b. It constructs a string
which when processed for generating ROS communica-
tion artifacts (messages), gets executed. The string itself
declares a Python object which on creation launches a
reverse shell back to the attacker’s (D1) hardcoded IP
address.
3) Step 5: control the computational graph and other
machines within the OT levels: Once the attacker has at
its disposal a reverse shell to Sˆ7 it becomes relatively
easy to command the different industrial subsystems. Sˆ7
acts as the ROS Master of the industrial network and
thereby can easily influence all ROS-Industrial package
deployments living in the control stations S1 to S5.
Such exploitation has been covered by other authors
including [23] and we refer the reader to this study for
further exploration on how to take control of the ROS
computational graph using the ROS Master and Slave
APIs.
4) Responsible disclosure and mitigation efforts:
Our team announced the Robot Vulnerability Database
in October 2019 for the ROS community6 and openly
disclosed our intention of cataloging and recording
early-phase security flaws applying to ROS. The flaw
described in here was first publicly filed in June 2020
and later elevated to a vulnerability in August 2020
with subsequent pull requests patching actionlib in
ROS Melodic Morenia7 and ROS Noetic Ninjemys8. The
suggested mitigations propose the use of safe parsing.
This way, the construction of communication artifacts
would only allow for simple objects like strings or
integers, removing the threat.
D. Attack 2 (A2): Disrupting ROS-Industrial communi-
cations by attacking underlying network protocols
As pointed out previously, ROS-Industrial software
builds on top of ROS packages which build on top of
traditional networking protocols at OSI layers 4 and 3.
It is common to find ROS deployments using TCP/IP in
the Transport and Network levels of the communication
stack. To further test the limits of these underlying layers
and its impact on ROS, we developed a complete ROS-
TCP networking package dissector and used it as a tool
for attacks. These consists of a malicious attacker with
privileged access to an internal ROS-enabled control
6https://bit.ly/2GBgk9v
7https://github.com/ros/actionlib/pull/170
8https://github.com/ros/actionlib/pull/171
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station (e.g. S1) disrupting the ROS-Industrial communi-
cations and interactions between other participants of the
network. The attack leverages the lack of authentication
in the ROS computational graph previously reported
in other vulnerabilities of ROS such as RVD#87 or
RVD#88.
By simply spoofing another participant’s credentials
(at the Network level) and either disturbing or flooding
communications within infrastructure’s Level 2 (Process
Network), we are able to heavily impact the ROS and
ROS-Industrial operation9. Our team considered a FIN-
ACK attack which aims to disrupt network activity
by saturating bandwidth and resources on stateful in-
teractions (i.e. TCPROS sockets). The simple proof-
of-concept we developed for validating this flaw can
be downloaded from https://bit.ly/3h5Fn11.
Further details are available in our extended report [25].
E. Attack 3 (A3): Person-In-The-Middle attack to a ROS
control station
A Person-in-the-Middle (PitM) attack targeting a con-
trol station (e.g. Sˆ2) consists of an adversary gaining
access to the network flow of information and sitting
in the middle, interfering with communications between
the original publisher and subscriber as desired. PitM
demands to conflict not just with the resolution and
addressing mechanisms but also to hijack the control
protocol being manipulated (ROSTCP). The attack gets
initiated by a malicious actor gaining access and control
of a machine in the network (step 1), such as done
with A1. Then, using the compromised computer on the
control network, the attacker poisons the ARP tables on
the target host (Sˆ7) and informs its target that it must
route all its traffic through a specific IP and hardware
address (step 2), i.e., the attackers owned machine. By
manipulating the ARP tables, the attacker can insert
themselves between Sˆ7 and Sˆ2 (step 3)10. When a
successful PitM attack is performed, the hosts on each
side of the attack are unaware that their network data is
taking a different route through the adversarys computer.
Once adversaries have successfully inserted their ma-
chine into the information stream, they have full control
over the communication and could carry out several
types of attacks. For example, the replay attack (step 4).
In its simplest form, captured data from Sˆ7 is replayed
or modified and replayed. During this replay attack
the adversary could continue to send commands to the
controller and/or field devices to cause an undesirable
event while the operator is unaware of the true state of
the system.
9The execution of these attacks required us to develop a package dissec-
tor/crafter and configure the attacker’s kernel to ignore certain types of network
requests so that it does not conflict with the attacking activity. Details on this
have been purposely omitted.
10The attack described in here is a specific PitM variant known as ARP PitM.
F. Attack 4 (A4): Exploiting known vulnerabilities in a
robot endpoint to compromise the ROS network
Attacks do not only necessarily come from the outside
(IT Level or the Cloud). Increasingly more reports [27]
are informing about the relevance of insider threats with
more than half of the attack vectors requiring physical
access. We studied one of such scenarios where we
attempted first to compromise Cˆ6 (failed) and then C3
using previously reported and known (yet unresolved)
zero day vulnerabilities in the robot controller11. Due
to the lack of concerns for security from manufacturers,
these end-points can easily become rogue and serve as
an entry point for malicious actors. After failing to take
over the hardened control station, our team successfully
prototyped a simplified attack using RVD#1495 (CVE-
2020-10290) and taking control over C3. From that point
on, we could access the ROS network completely and
pivot (A1), disrupt (A2) or PitM (A3) as desired.
V. DISCUSSION
In this section, we summarize and discuss our findings
and lessons learned.
A. Findings
Table I summarizes the attacks and their impact with
respect to our two goals. G1 is achieved in all the
presented attacks whereas G2 is mostly achieved yet
depends on the hardening of the corresponding control
stations and robotic endpoints. At the time of writing,
among the vulnerabilities we exploited most remain
active. An exception is RVD#2401 which got resolved
by Open Robotics within 30 hours from the moment we
submitted a mitigation.
The original research question posed whether ROS
could be used securely on industrial use cases. Based
on our experimental results, we found: With the current
status of ROS, it is hardly possible to guarantee security
without additional measures.
B. Lessons learned
Through our experiments we showed how control sta-
tions running Ubuntu 18.04 do not protect ROS or
ROS-Industrial deployments. Moreover, the guidelines
offered by Canonical [9] for securing ROS were of little
use against targeted attacks. Certain ongoing hardening
efforts for ROS Melodic [10] helped mitigate some
issues but as highlighted in Table I, most goals were
still achieved with attacks targeting threats like zero day
vulnerabilities, wide and availability of industrial com-
ponents, inadequate security practices or non-patched
OS and firmware.
11Examples of past zero day attacks include RVD#1413 , RVD#1410,
RVD#673 or RVD#1408 among others.
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TABLE I: Summarizes security incidents demonstrated for the elected industrial
use case as part of the red teaming exercise. Rn refers to the n robot of the
use case as depicted in Figure 1.
Attack Description Goals
met
A1.1: remove
arbitrary code
execution
Subject to some prior interactions, at-
tacker with control of D1 is able to ex-
ploit a vulnerability in ROS and launch
arbitrary remote code executions from a
privileged ROS end-point compromising
completely the computational graph
G1 and
G2 (R1,
R2, R3,
R4 and
R5)
A1.2: privilege
escalation
Subject to local access, attacker is able
to exploit a vulnerability in ROS and
escalate privileges (to the ROS ones) in
such machine
G1
A2: FIN-ACK
flood attack
targeting ROS
Attacker attempts to deny ROSTCP con-
nection on target destination by forcing a
maxed-out number of connections
G1 and
G2 (R1,
R2, R3,
R4 and
R5)
A3: PitM at-
tack to a ROS
control station
Attacker poisons ARP tables and gains
access to the network flow of information
siting between targeted publishers and
subscribers, interfering with communica-
tions as desired.
G1 and
G2 (R1,
R2, R3,
R4 and
R5)
A4: Insider
endpoint
via unprotected
robot controller
Attackers exploit known vulnerabilities in
a robot endpoint to compromise the con-
troller and pivot into the ROS network.
G1 and
G2 (R1,
R2, R3,
R4, R5
and R6)
Dedicated robotic security protection systems like the
Robot Immune System (RIS) [28] used in Cˆ2, Cˆ5 or
Cˆ6 managed to secure the corresponding robot avoiding
directed attacks. However R2 and R5 robots were still
hijacked by compromising the ROS computational graph
via their control stations. RIS was not able to stop these
attacks because they came from trusted sources whose
behavior was learned over a prior training phase. An
exception was R6 which we were not able to compro-
mise thanks RIS being installed at Cˆ6 whereas R3 (not
protected) was easily compromised and used as a rogue
endpoint for attackers to pivot into other malicious en-
deavors. From this, we conclude that industrial scenarios
like the one presented in this use case using ROS must
not only follow ICS guidelines [7], [8] but also harden
robot endpoints and the ROS computational graph across
each phase, from development to post-production [29].
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this study, we presented four targeted attacks over
a synthetic industrial scenario constructed by follow-
ing international ICS cybersecurity standards where the
control logic is operated by ROS and ROS-Industrial
packages. Our attacks exploited both new and known
vulnerabilities of ROS achieving the two goals we set.
We managed to execute code remotely (A1) in a ROS
end-point, disrupt the ROS computational graph (A2),
impersonate a ROS control station through PitM (A3)
and finally use an unprotected robot endpoint to pivot
into the ROS network (A4). For future work we plan to
look into other Operating Systems as a starting point for
secure ROS deployment and explore additional security
measures.
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